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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, a body corporate 
and politic, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JUDY BAXTER, SQUAW PEAK, INC., 
TOM STUBBS, FRANK HORTON and 
DIANA HORTON, 
Defendant-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
CASE NO. 
17039 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal from an action initiated by Utah 
County pursuant to the County's Zoning Ordinance and the 
Utah Enabling Statutes to obtain an injunction against the 
continued commercial use of a single-family residence which 
is owned by the defendant-appellant, and which propertv 
is situated in the Critical Environmental I Zone in Utah 
County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Fourth District Court in and for Utah County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Judge Presiding 
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and sitting without a jury, issued an injunction prohibiting 
the further commercial use of appellant's single-family 
residence which use is not permitted in the Critical Envir-
onmental I Zone of Utah County. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the District Court's 
decision and findings which granted plaintiff a permanent 
injunction prohibiting the defendant from further commercial 
use of the single-family dwelling on the property in question 
until such time as the zone is changed permitting expanded 
commercial use, or until such time as it is otherwise per-
mitted by law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There existed two structures on the subject property: 
(1) a single-family residence constructed in March of 1953 
(T.R. 31) and (2) the Riverbend Lounge, a commercial establisl 
ment. 
While the property in question is presently in the 
Critical Environmental I Zone, it previously had been in the 
Watershed Conservation Zone (W.C.I.). Said property never was 
within a Commercial Zone. Land within the Critical Environ-
mental Zone has functioned historically as a primary watershed 
for much of the irrigation and culinary water supply for the 
Utah Valley area. Experience has shown this watershed area to 
-2-
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be environmentally fragile; its preservation is of critical 
importance to the County. 4-5-S(A) of "The 1976 Revised 
Zoning Ordinance of Utah County, Utah." 
Both the single-family residence and the Riverbend Lounge 
were separate non-conforming uses in the Critical Environmental 
Zone upon adoption. (T.R. 31, 35). On January 17, 1977, the 
business known as the Riverbend Lounge was destroyed by fire 
(T. R. 34, 42) • ,Prior to the fire, appellant-defendant had 
resided in the residence on the subject property. (T.R. 42). 
A building permit was issued to defendants for the construction 
of a steak house to replace the Lounge which had burned down. 
(T.R. 25). Also, on or about November 15, 1978, defendant-
appellant made application to remodel the single-family resi-
dence on the premises. Defendant-appellant indicated on the 
building permit that the existing use of the parcel was "single 
family" and that the intended use of the parcel was "single 
family". (Plaintiff's Exhibit "l"). Defendant-appellant 
provided all the information for the permit while a county 
employee prepared the form (T.R. 43). 
With her application, defendant-appellant submitted a 
site plan prepared by herself expressing what was to be done 
with the property (T.R. 43), (plaintiff's Exhibit "3"). On 
the site plan, defendant-appellant has identified a kitchen, 
a living room, bedrooms, closets and other rooms common to a 
-3-
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residence. Both the building permit application and the 
site plan contain no indication whatsoever that the subject 
property was to be used other than for a single-family residen 
Since the permit and the site plan were in order, a permit 
issued. 
At the time of application, defendant-appellant anticipat 
spending $3,500 to remodel (Plaintiff's Exhibit "l"). She 
estimated at trial that she actually spent between $12,000 
and $15,000 (T.R. 47). 
After completion of the improvements to the home, defen-
dant-appellant made application for a business license for sai 
structure. The same was denied. 
Defendant-appellant never did have a business license to 
operate commercially from the single-family residence (T.R. 44 
The Riverbend Lounge, which had burned down, was totally 
reconstructed into a new facility, the Squaw Peak Steakhouse. 
It was completed and opened for business on December 31, 1979. 
Upon completion of the steak house, defendant-appellant 
intended to transfer back into that new facility. tt.R. 50 and 
51). Defendant-appellant knew that her commercial use of the 
home was, at best, temporary. (T.R. 50). Defendant-appellant 
never intended to have two commercial businesses on the 
property. (T.R. 51). Because of partnership problems, not 
because of any misleading on the part of Utah County or the 
-4-
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Building or Zoning Department, defendant-appellant was unable 
to transfer her business to the new facility and, therefore, 
operated a commercial business in the single-family residence. 
(T.R. 51). 
Plaintiff brought this action because defendant-appellant 
changed the use of a single-family residence to a business, all 
contrary to "The 1976 Revised Zoning Ordinance of Utah County, 
Utah"; because a single-family residence and a commercial 
business had expanded into two businesses in the Critical En-
vironmental Zone. "The 1976 Revised Zoning Ordinance of Utah 
County, Utah" provides: 
A nonconforming use of a building or 
lot shall not be changed to another nonconforming 
use whatsoever. Changes in use shall not be made, 
except to a conforming use. 4-l-8(D). 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE DEFENDANT IS WITHOUT STANDING IN 
EQUITY TO PRAY FOR ESTOPPEL. 
The frequently cited maxim that "he who comes into 
equity must come with clean hands" is an ancient and favorite 
precept of the Equity Court. See Salt Lake County v. Kartchner. 
552 P.2d 136, 139 (Utah, 1976). The same principle is expresse< 
in the language that "he who has done inequity shall not have 
equity". The principle announced thereby is recognized as bein 
a fundamental principle of equity jurisprudence. National F. 
-5-
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Insurance Company v. Thompson, 281 U.S. 331, 74 L. Ed. 881, 
50 s. Ct. 288. The underlying theory inherent in the clean 
hands doctrine is that equity has for its purpose the dispensi 
of unalloyed justice and that, as Lord Chief Justice Wilmot 
observed, "No polluted hand shall touch the pure fountain of 
justice". See Rock v. Matthews, 35 w. Va. 531, 14 S.E. 137. 
It is equally well settled that one's misconduct or lack 
of conduct need not necessarily have been of such a nature as 
be punishable as a crime or as to.justify legal proceeding of 
any character. Any willful act concerning the cause of action 
which rightly can be said to ~ransgress equitable standards of 
conduct is sufficient cause for the invocation of the maxim. 
27 Am. Jur.2d Equity, Section 138. The "clean hands" doctrine 
takes on even greater significance when the suit in equity 
concerns a public interest. 27 Am. Jur.2d Equity, Section 136 
at Page 668 states: 
... [W]here a suit in equity concerns 
the public interest as well as the private interest 
of the litigant, the doctrine that he who comes 
into equity must come with clean hands assumes a 
greater significance since it not only prevents a 
wrongdoer from enjoying the fruits of his trans-
gressions, but_ also averts_an injury to the 
public. See also Precision Instrument Mfg. Company 
v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Company, 324 U.S. 
806, 89 L. Ed. 1381, 65 S. Ct. 993. 
In the instant case, defendant would have this Court esto1 
the County from exercising its police powers. To grant such 
relief would infer that the defendant has sought equity with 
-6-
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"clean hands". Such an inference is in direct conflict with 
the evidence presented and is contrary to the findings of the 
trial Court. In support thereof, the plaintiff would specifi-
cally draw this Court's attention to the following: 
First, the building permit was issued for the remodelling 
of a "single-family residence" with an estimated cost of $3,500. 
(See plaintiff's Exhibit "l"). However, in fact, between 
$12,000 and $15,000 were expended. Ms. Baxter provided plaintif· 
with the $3,500 estimate and executed the permit bearing that 
figure. (Plaintiff's Exhibit "l"). (T.R. 67). Just above de-
fendant's. signature is the following agreement: 
I agree to comply with all the county and 
state building laws and ordinances, that the 
representations in this application for a building 
permit are true and accurate, andauy misinterpreta-
tion or error herein are the sole responsibility of 
the applicant, and shall in no way incur or accrue 
liability or obligation to Utah County, its officers 
or agents. (Plaintiff's Exhibit "l") . 
Secondly, Ms. Baxter, on the face of the building permit, 
designated the intended use of the structure as "single-family 
residence" (Plaintiff's Exhibit "l"). 
Thirdly, Ms. Baxter submitted a site plan, on which she 
described rooms common to a single-family residence and not a 
commercial establishment. She testified that the "living room" 
in said site plan now has tables and chairs and a portable bar. 
The large "closet" in said site plan is now a large walk-in 
cooler. It became very clear in trial that the representations 
of defendant on the building permit and site plan were not 
"true and accurate". 
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Certainly the weight of the evidence supported the 
Court's finding: 
That the defendant, Judy Baxter, had no 
agreement with plaintiff allowing commercial use 
of the single-family dwelling. 
In light of the above, it stands to reason that the 
estoppel argument can best be applied against the defendant; 
she cannot now claim the building permit was issued for a 
commercial business when all her designations on the requisite 
documents are for a "single-family residence". Therefore, 
the rules of equity do not assist her in her claim. 
II 
EVEN ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE COURT 
FINDS THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS SOUGHT 
EQUITY NITH CLEAN HANDS, THEN ON THE MERITS 
OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED, THE COUNTY CANNOT 
BE ESTOPPED FROM SEEKING A PERMANENT INJUNC-
TION BASED ON A VALID EXERCISE OF ITS POLICE 
POWER. 
The defendant alleges that the County should be estopped 
from seeking a permanent injunction. Defendant bases her 
allegation on the notion that "a party seeking an injunction 
must show a clear legal or equitable right and a well-grounded 
fear of immediate invasion of that right." 
Further, defendant contends that the Court erred by faili1 
to balance the conveniences prior to granting the injunction 
in favor of plaintiff. 
-8-
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Defendant's contention and reasoning is faulty in several 
respects because we are dealing with zoning laws. The doctrine 
of estoppel is not generally applicable against a government 
body. Only under "exceptional circumstances" have a few juris-
dictions allowed estoppel to be applied. See State, etc. v. 
St. Charles City Board of Adjustment, 553 S.W.2d 729 (Miss. 1977) 
In Utah, the above-stated exception allowing estoppel against 
a municipal entity, was addressed by the Court in Salt Lake 
County v. Kartchner, 552 P.2d 136, 138 (Utah, 1976), wherein 
the Court stated: 
Estoppel, waiver or laches ordinarily do not 
constitute a defence to a suit for injunctive 
relief against alleged violations of zoning laws, 
unless the circumstances are exceptional. Zoning 
ordinances are governmental acts which rest upon 
the police power and as to violations thereof any 
inducements, reliances, negligence of enforcement, 
or like factors are merely aggravations of the 
violation rather than excuses or justifications 
therefor. [Emphasis added]. 
In Kartchner, supra, the County was estopped because it 
was notuniformly enforcing the law. Such is not the case in thE 
present matter now before this Court. As the Court in State, 
etc. v. St. Charles City Board of Adjustment, supra, admonished 
"The doctrine of estoppel is not generally applicable against 
a governmental body and if applied, it is done so only in 
exceptional circumstances and with great caution." [Emphasis 
added]. 553 S.W.2d at 726. 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Defendant has further asserted that Utah County is 
estopped by the acts of its agents. In response to such a 
claim, first and foremost, defendant-appellant admitted that 
she was not misled by Utah County and its employees. (T.R. 51 
The Court, supported by the evidence at trial, found no mis-
leading by respondent. Thus, an essential element of an equit. 
estoppel is missing. 
Second, the structure, itself, is a home and does not 
violate the zoning laws; it is only the commercial use that is 
proscribed. 
As a matter of law, estoppel may not_be used as a defense 
by one who acted fraudulently, or in bad faith, or with knowle1 
BA McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3rd Ed. Rev.), Sec. 25.3· 
P. 517; Utah County v. Kenneth J. Young, et al., Utah, 615 P.21 
1265 (1980). 
Even if it had been determined that County had misled 
Ms. Baxter, estoppel is not always available. ~T~e principle 
well established that a public or governmental corporation sucl 
as a municipal corporation is not estopped by the acts of its 
officers when they exceed their powers. The rule is that per-
sons dealing with such officers must, at their peril, ascertai1 
the scope of their authority." 3 McQuillan, Municipal Corpora· 
tions, Third Edition, Section 12.126a at Page 534. 
The above languaqe was cited with favor in Dansie v. 
Murray City, 560 P.2d 1123 (Utah, 1977). 
-10-
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The underlying reason for the rule as cited above and 
applied by the Court in Dansie, was best stated by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court in Alexander Company v. Owatonna, 24 N.W. 2d 244 
(Minn. 1946), wherein it stated: 
A contrary .rule would lead to chaos in 
municipal affairs. If the doctrine of estoppel 
could be invoked in such situations, municipali-
ties would repeatedly find themselves bound by 
the unauthorized acts of their officers and 
agents possessing only limited authority. Ex-
perience has shown the wisdom of the prevailing 
rule and persons dealing with municipal officers 
and agents are bound by constructive notice of 
the law and public records with respect to the 
powers and functions of such officers or agents. 
Defendant has relied upon a mountain of case law to drive 
home a non-meritorious point and in so doing has ignored the 
fact that estoppel is inapplicable, except under exceptional 
circumstances. 
Further, it is unreasonable to think that a municipality 
must weigh and consider the "conveniences" before exercising 
legitimate police powers in enforcing its zoning laws. That 
theory is not a "well established and fundamental rule of 
law" in the field of zoning enforcement. 
III 
THB FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE, B~CAUSE 
OF HIS ADVANTAGED POSITION, OUGET NOT BE 
DISTURBED UNLESS THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY 
PREPONDERATES TO THE CONTRARY. 
Defendant-appellant alleges that "at no time during the 
trial was any evidence elicited or put forth by plaintiff-
-11-
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respondent to in any way reflect that the plaintiff had 
suffered irreparable injury or harm"o Evidently, counsel has 
forgotten plaintiff's first witness~ 
As its first witness, the Chief of the Food Section in 
the City-County Health Department was called. In that capacity 
he performed an inspection of the commercial establishment in 
the single-family residence, resulting in a finding of health, 
safety, and sanitary deficiencies (T.R. 21). 
When plaintiff attempted to inquire of the Health Officer 
concerning those deficiencies, counsel for defendant strenu-
ously objecfed, claiming that "nothing there is relevant to 
this proceeding". (T. R. 21) . 
It is Utah County's position that health deficiencies in 
a food establishment are a detriment to Utah County and its 
residents and can cause irreparable harm. Certainly the Court 
can reasonably infer that health and safety deficiencies will 
affect Utah County residents. 
Counsel, upon objecting to the evidence and claiming it 
to be irrelevant, ought to be estopped from claiming on appeal 
that it is totally necessary, requisite and relevant and that 
the lack of said information forms the basis for reversal. 
Those positions are patently inconsistent. 
On Appeal, this Court will not disturb the action of the 
trial Court unless the evidence clearly preponderates to the 
contrary, or the trial Court has abused its discretion, or 
-12-
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misapplied principles of law. Eastman v. Eastman, Utah, 
558 P.2d 514 (1976); Watson v. Watson, Utah, 561 P.2d 1072 
(1977); and Pope v. Pope, Utah, 589 P.2d 752 (1978). 
In a recent Utah case, Tanner v. Baadsgaard, Utah, 
612 P.2d 345 (1980), this Court stated its well-established 
rule: 
Due to the prerogatives and advantaged 
position of the trial judge, we indulge con-
siderable deference to his findings. Where 
the evidence is in dispute, we assume that he 
believed that which is favorable to his findings, 
and we do not disturb them unless it clearly 
preponderates to the contrary. The Court relied 
upon sound Utah case law: Timpanogos Highlands, 
Inc. v. Harper, Utah, 544 P.2d 481 (1975); 
Pagano v. Walker, Utah,539 P.2d 452 (1975); 
McBride v. McBride, Utah,581 P.2d 997 (1978); 
Kier v. Condrack, 25 Utah 2d 139, 478 P.2d 327 
(1970). 
Based upon the record, certainly the trial judge did not 
abuse his discretion in holding that the County was not 
estopped from seeking injunctive relief. The findings in 
the instant case are supported by the evidence and should not 
be disturbed. 
IV 
THE DOCTRINE OF "LACHES" IS BARRED. 
Defendant-appellant contends that Utah County delayed in 
asserting its rights, being guilty of laches. While it is true 
that several months passed before a suit was filed, Utah County 
was working with Ms. Baxter's counsel from May, 1979, attemptin~ 
to resolve this matter. Certainly Utah County should not be 
-13-
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faulted for attempting to resolve this matter short of liti-
gation, even though that policy may cause some delay in the 
filing of a law suit, if or when it becomes necessarye 
It appears that defendant-appellant has delayed in 
asserting the defense of laches. Such defense is clearly an 
affirmative defense. Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides: 
In pleading to a preceding pleading, a 
party shall set forth affirmatively . . . laches 
o •• , and any other matter constituting an 
avoidance or affirmative defense. 
Defendant-appellant never raised the defense of laches 
in her answer, nor was any claim or argument made at trial. 
Clearly it is untimely to raise the defense of laches for the 
first time at appellate review. The argument should be barred 
Defendant's argument is also marred by the fact that no 
vested right to violate a zoning ordinance can be acquired by 
a continuing violation. Lockard v. Los Angeles, 33 Cal.2d 453 
202 P.2d 38, 7 A.L.R.2d 990, cert. den., 337 U.S. 939, 93 
L. Ed. 1744, 69 S. Ct. 1516. Mere non-action by a municipalit: 
does not constitute acquiescence. Rockford v. Sallee, 129 
Ill. App.2d 75, 262 N.E.2d 485. The doctrine of laches does 
not ordinarily apply to a municipality whose duty it is to 
enforce its own zoning regulations. 82 Am. Jur.2d §253. 
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CONCLUSION 
The defendant-appellant has gone far afield in her 
arguments. The trial judge characterized this case as a 
zoning case and narrowed the issues. It was not meant to be 
a review of the denial of Ms. Baxter's beer license. Nothing 
in the pleadings refers to a beer license. 
The granting or denial of a beer license is within the 
exclusive domain of the Board of Utah County Commissioners. 
Said Board has never been joined as a party to this action. 
It should be emphasized that Iva Snell, a County Building and 
Zoning Officer, contrary to statements found in the defendant-
appellant' s Brief, has no authority whatsoever to deny or 
grant approval of a beer license. 
Many of the defendant-appellant's arguments are rendered 
irrelevant because they are beyond the scope of this trial. 
Defendant's counsel have confused the facts considerably. 
That is -understandable because they are the third firm of 
attorneys representing Ms. Baxter in this case. Furthermore, 
they have attempted to reconstruct the case without the ad-
vantage of having participated at the trial, nor at any of the 
Commission hearings prior to trial. 
Defendant-appellant has argued page after page the 
doctrine of estoppel and laches. The doctrine of laches is 
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simply barred for failure of timeliness. Also, the maxim 
that "he who comes into equity must come with clean hands" 
is an ancient precept of the Equity Court. In the instant 
case, the defendant is seeking this shield of equity without 
clean hands, and the relief prayed for should be denied. 
Defendant-appellant has ignored the fact that the doctrine 
of estoppel is generally not available against a governmental 
entity unless the circumstances are exceptional. The plaintiff 
County, vigorously contends that no exceptional circumstances 
exist in the instant case which would estop the County from 
exercising its inherent police power to protect the health, 
safety, and general well-being of the public. 
The defendant-appellant has attempted to make complex that 
which is very simple. 
Defendant-appellant testified or admitted at trial: 
1. That she endorsed the building permit claiming the 
intended use was to be residential; 
2. That she filed a site plan with rooms identified 
as residential rooms (living room, bedroom, etc.); 
3. That she estimated the remodelling of the home would 
be $3500. She actually spent between $12,000 and 
$15,000 (T.R. 44); 
4. That she, in fact, used the home for a commercial 
business; 
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5. That she never had a business license to conduct 
a business in the home (T.R. 44); 
6. That she intended the commercial use of the home to 
be temporary; to be used during the construction 
period of the restaurant by her partners (T.R. 50); 
7. That when her partners completed the new steak house, 
she intended to transfer the business to the new 
structure (T.R. 51); 
8. That upon completion of the same, she experienced 
problems with her partners and was unable to transfer 
(T.R. 51); 
9. That the problems were not caused by any misleading 
on the part of Utah County or its officers, and that 
the problems resulted from a partnership breakdown 
(T.R. 51). 
There is no question that where there once existed one 
commercial business, Ms. Baxter and her partners now have two 
in that Critical Environmental Zone. There is no question 
that a single-family residence has been converted to a com-
mercial use. 
Defendant-appellant continued her commercial use of the 
home long past the newly completed construction, and even long 
past the trial and the issuance of the injunction. 
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Defendant has prayed that the injunction be lifted and 
that she be entitled to a permanent commercial use of the 
single-family residence. She is asking this Court to grant 
her a permanent commercial use in an already non-conforming 
residential building, contrary to the zoning ordinance of Utah 
County and contrary to the evidence presented at trial. 
Plaintiff respectfully resists that prayer for relief and 
requests that this Court affirm the lower Court. 
Respectfully submitted this 
day of December, 1980. 
NOALL T. WOOTTON 
Utah County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
By~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
L YNN W. DAVIS 
Deputy County Attorney 
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